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 Abstract 
We evaluate the contribution of Nobel Prize-winner Daniel Kahneman, often in association with his late 
co-author Amos Tversky, to the development of our understanding of financial decision-making and 
the evolution of behavioural finance as a school of thought within Finance. While a general evaluation 
of the work of Kahneman would be a massive task, we constrain ourselves to a more narrow discussion 
of his vision of financial-decision making compared to a possible alternative advanced by Gerd 
Gigerenzer along with numerous co-authors. Both Kahneman and Gigerenzer agree on the centrality of 
heuristics in decision making.  However, for Kahneman heuristics often appear as a fall back when the 
standard von-Neumann-Morgenstern axioms of rational decision-making do not describe investors' 
choices. In contrast, for Gigerenzer heuristics are simply a more effective way of evaluating choices in 
the rich and changing decision making environment investors must face.  Gigerenzer challenges 
Kahneman to move beyond substantiating the presence of heuristics towards a more tangible, 
testable, description of their use and disposal within the ever changing decision-making environment 
financial agents inhabit. Here we see the emphasis placed by Gigerenzer on how context and cognition 
interact to form new schemata for fast and frugal reasoning as offering a productive vein of new 
research. We illustrate how the interaction between cognition and context already characterises much 
empirical research and it appears the fast and frugal reasoning perspective of Gigerenzer can provide a 
framework to enhance our understanding of how financial decisions are made. 
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1. The debate
The publication of Daniel Kahneman's Thinking fast and slow (henceforth TF&S) gives occasion  to 
evaluate the Nobel Prize-winner's contribution, often in association with his late co-author Amos 
Tversky, to the development of our understanding of financial decision-making and the evolution of 
behavioural finance as a school of thought within Finance.  
While such an evaluation is a massive task, we constrain ourselves here a more narrow 
discussion of Kahneman's vision of financial-decision making compared to a possible alternative 
advanced by Gerd Gigerenzer along with numerous co-authors.     
       Much of the teaching of Finance and financial advice is predicated on the idea that models, 
incorporating stylised rational behaviour, outperform received wisdom or professional rules of thumb. 
One of the essential texts of behavioural finance research Gilovich et al (2002) is entitled “Heuristics 
and biases” with the implication being conveyed that if you are smart you will avoid invoking heuristics. 
But is this true? 
Could it be that the race goes to the conventional and naturally incurious rather than the 
calculative and all seeing "rational"/ Laplacean demon agent (Mcgrayne, 2011)?  We believe the 
answer is yes, or at least it can be yes in a wide variety of evironments/contexts we frequently 
encounter.  This is because Kahneman and Tversky ( henceforth K&T), and adherents to expected 
utility theory in general, may not have the monopoly on what is “rational”.  
       Gigerenzer's definition of rationality is very much an ecological one not a procedural one. He 
advances tools for the making the best decision in a rapidly changing uncertain environment rather 
than some optimal decision-making tool for implementation in a risky environment when all the states 
and the probability of their outcome are known. A central element in the debate is the relative scope 
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of application in financial decision-making of risky, as opposed to truly uncertain, choice. Gigerenzer 
focuses on the latter, K&T the former.  
In a lengthy program of research, yielding many papers in prestigious Journals, Gerd 
Gigerenzer, of the Max Planck Institute in Berlin, has developed the notion that the reason most of us 
regularly use heuristics, is simply because they work, i.e. produce better decisions  (Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein, 1996, Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009, Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011, Todd and  
Gigerenzer, 2003).  This makes Gigerenzer call for a “heuristics revolution” in our understanding of 
human decision--making (Gigerenzer, 2014).  
        Gigerenzer's research shows that in decision-making often less is more and we really need to 
``keep it simple stupid'', or at least make it simple to avoid acting stupidly.  But Gigerenzer's critique 
has rarely appeared in major Finance Journals or, more remarkably, even influenced discussion at all2. 
A recent working paper by the Bank of England's Financial Stability Board (Aikman et al, 2014) suggests, 
however, that the appeal amongst economic policy makers of this view may be rising (see also Neth et 
al, 2014).    
1.1 Gigerenzer's critique. 
Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) cast doubt on the development of ``dual process'' characterisation 
of cognition. An example of such a characterisation is TF&S's System 1 and 2 schemata, which sees the 
mind as flipping between superior and inferior modes of thought. Hence for Gigerenzer and Todd 
       “The unquestioned assumption behind these [dual process] theories is that more laborious, 
computationally expensive and non heuristic the strategy the better the judgements to which it 
gives rise. The more--is--better ideology ignores the ecological rationality of cognitive 
strategies.” (and Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999, p 20) 
2 According to Google Scholar accessed in June 2015 the work of Kahneman is cited almost 20 times 
more than that of Gigerenzer in Finance Journals but only about 5 times more often across all fields. 
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here a heuristic is just a means “to find or discover” (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1998, p 25) and is not clear 
that the most tortuous mode of discovery is the best.  
Indeed Gigerenzer (see Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996) has questioned whether some of even the 
most basic axioms of ``rational'' choice, like transitivity and compensation across choice characteristics, 
have much predictive value. 
“there seems little empirical evidence for the view of the mind as a Laplacean Demon equipped 
with the computational powers to perform multiple regressions. But this need not be taken as 
bad news. The beauty of the nonlinear satisfying algorithms is that they can match the 
[Laplaceon] Demon's performance with less searching, less knowledge and less computational 
might.” (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996, p 26)    
       So this paper outlines a path to pass beyond the mere chronicling of how heuristics and biases are 
manifest in financial markets, a task brilliantly performed by K&T and those influenced by them, 
towards the question of when and where heuristics are most strongly made manifest and when is their 
influence abated.   
       Gigerenzer's research programme aims to correct a common, and perhaps convenient for some, 
misunderstanding of  Herbert Simon's  bounded rationality. This is the view that bounded rationality 
asserts economic agents are simply incompetent or irrational. Quite conversely bounded rationality 
envisages decision-makers responding to both their cognitive limitations and the priorities of their 
environment in a resourceful and adaptive way when the decision-making context itself is constantly 
changing. 
Lockton (2012) shows how Simon's “behavioural scissors”, by capturing the interlocking of 
cognition  and context, can be applied for behavioural modelling in designs aiming to induce  
behavioural change within the built environment and elsewhere. Applications to financial decision-
© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
6 
making of such reasoning will surely emerge soon.  We point to some such first fruits of the fast and 
frugal reasoning approach in the final substantive section of this paper.  
       Gigerenzer points out that this vision of the mind as a computational machine is very recent and 
follows on directly from the widespread adoption of random-sampling and the associated use of 
hypothesis testing for the difference between a control and treated sample (Gigerenzer, 2000(a)). He 
points out that while in social science statistics are invoked to check the validity of theories in 
Astronomy the original use of statistics was to screen collected data for unreliable/error--prone 
observations.  
       Gigerenzer (1991) "tools to theories" heuristic sees psychological theory as emerging from the 
investigative tools researchers have to hand. Theories framed by current investigative methods are 
then employed to understand the nature of the cognitive process. But Gigerenzer (1991) argues that 
both the calculative power and its motivation to calculate of the human mind has been overplayed by 
cognitive psychology researchers in the 1950s who were newly baptised in statistical techniques like 
regression and correlation. Because academics thought in statistical terms it seemed natural to think 
their subjects also did (Gigerenzer et al 1989). 
1.2 The building blocks of heuristics 
    The central thesis of much of Gigerenzer's research is that the primary determinant of the 
value of a heuristic in any decision-making context is the environment. Heuristic selection and the 
environment go together like the two blades of a scissors in Herbert Simon's vivid image (Simon, 1990, 
p. 7).
       Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009, p. 113) identify some common building blocks that might serve as a 
starting-point. These are 
• a search rule, say the number of stocks to be included in the portfolio,
• a stopping rule, say a yearly portfolio evaluation period,
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• a decision rule, say a choice of portfolio weights.
 TF&S (p 98) define a heuristic as “a very simple procedure that helps find adequate, though often 
imperfect, answers to difficult questions”. Similarly, but with a more positive view Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier offer the following definition: 
       “A heuristic is a strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making 
decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than more complex methods.”  Gigerenzer 
and Gaissmaier, (2011), p 454. 
       The emphasis is upon grounded decision-making of practical, frequently encountered, problems 
rather than stylising choice to its most generalised, abstract, level. An example of this is the adoption 
of "TIT-FOR-TAT" strategies by players in the Prisoner's dilemma, even though full "rationality" would 
caution them to defect initially (Axelrod, 1984). Indeed Axelrod (1984) reports that such a simple TIT-
FOR-TAT rule won out in a computer programming competition which invited "solutions" to the 
problem of how best to play the Prisoner's dilemma game.  
1.3 Different models or different objectives? 
    We must be wary of presenting the work of K&T and Gigerzenzer as binary opposites, as in 
many ways these researchers have somewhat different objectives and not just different research 
methods to pursue the same objective. To see this let us consider the best known of K&T's work, 
prospect theory.    
Kahneman (1979, 1992, Wakker 2010) evaluates gambles by the impact of choices on changes, 
rather than levels, of wealth and their movement relative to some relevance reference/benchmark 
level of utility/wealth. In advancing this challenge to the standard utility theory framework the authors' 
ambition was deliberately modest as TF&S states the case  
“we constructed a theory that modified expected utility theory just enough to explain our 
collection of observations. That was prospect theory.” TF&S, p. 272. 
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 As such prospect theory can be seen as an evolution from standard expected utility necessitated by 
the need to accommodate anomalous findings. 
 As such the K&T agenda can be reduced to simply patching up expected utility theory and allowing 
the rest of economic analysis to proceed unhindered, save for the need to adopt a revised utility 
function. TF&S summarises its success as follows: 
 “Prospect theory was accepted by many scholars not because it was "true" but because the 
concepts that it added to utility theory, notably the reference point and loss-aversion, were 
worth the trouble.” (p. 288) 
 But this begs the question whether such an incremental adjustment is enough to provide a 
satisfactory theory of human choice and specifically investment choices? Is it sufficient to embed a few 
adjustments into a standard utility function and proceed as normal?  
Berg and Gigerenzer (2010) argue it is not, interpreting much of behavioural economics as a 
“repair program” using loose language and the introduction of new parameters into existing neo-
classical models as a way of avoiding the thing most needed. These are credible models of financial 
decisions that both explain current choices and predict future ones. These authors almost find it easy 
to parody much of the most highly cited and influential work in the field as follows. 
“Behavioural models frequently add new parameters to a neo-classical model, which 
necessarily increases R-squared. Then this increased R-squared is used as empirical support for 
behavioural models without subjecting them to out-of-sample prediction tests.” Berg and 
Gigerenzer, (2010, p 137). 
This distinction between descriptive and predictive models is one that has haunted applications 
of behavioural finance as we shall see in the final section of this paper. 
We investigate here a more radical point of departure suggested by Gert Gigerenzer and co-
authors as an alternative to the K&T theoretical framework for behavioural finance.  As  behavioural 
finance matures it is inevitable different traditions within the perspective will emerge (DeBondt  et al, 
2008). 
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       For Gigerenzer and his co-authors there is no unique rationality to be uncovered anyway, as what 
is rational is simply context dependent. But perhaps the most striking difference between the 
Gigerenzer and K&T's viewpoint on financial decision-making is that for Kahneman in TF&S the main 
choice is between thinking in two different modes, while Gigerenzer prefers to emphasise the intuitive, 
unthought, nature of so much of our action,  including financial trades.  
       So Gigerenzer draws on the prior work on “unconscious influences” by Hermann von Helmholtz 
(Gigerenzer, 2007, pp 44). Such influences allow us to thread together a myriad of data regarding 
context and character to make speedy and largely beneficial decisions. So one way to see the role of 
unconscious influences is as a sort of extreme fast (System 1) thought process as Gigerenzer puts it 
       “Humans would not be called Homo Sapiens if all inferences were like reflexes...... other 
rules of thumb have all the advantages of perceptual  bets -- such as being fast, frugal, and 
adapted to the environment -- but their use is not fully automatic. Although typically 
unconscious, they can be subjected to conscious intervention.” (Gigerenzer, 2007, p. 45) 
Thus the disagreement between the two perspectives on decision-making may be conceived of as 
turning on the role of conscious deliberation, or more dramatically, the extent to which are actions are 
preceded by active cognition in any sense.  
       For the K&T the key distinction is between immediate and deliberative cognition (system 1 and 2 
cognition mechanisms) but Gigerenzer's decision-making schemata sees financial decisions as 
dominated by unconscious influences, whimsy and almost reflex responses conditioned more by 
culture and social norms than active reasoning.   
1.4 The heuristic toolbox for financial decision-making. 
       In stark contrast to the heuristics and biases research program of K&T Gigerenzer argues that 
the reason why we make such intensive use of simple rules, heuristic tools, for financial decision-
making and much else in life is simply because they work. Probabilistic reasoning, and its associated 
expected utility calculus, are often discarded in favour of ``fast and frugal reasoning" which focuses on 
a few cue variables to stylise the choice before us. This happens for two reasons 
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1. we are boundedly rational and not rational calculating machines, we want to make the right 
choice but making some choice is even more important. 
2. many decisions as considered under conditions of uncertainty not risk. Think of many simple 
examples. Will Britain leave the European Union? Will Ukraine ultimately join the European 
Union? While these are clearly sensible questions, which are commonly discussed, we feel 
often unable to attach probabilities to these events. Certainly any attempt to do so cannot 
draw on the frequency of previous exits and entries to the Union.      
Artinger et al (2014) state the central tensions between the heuristics and biases approach and 
Gigerenzer's fast and frugal reasoning approach as follows 
• fast and frugal reasoning focuses upon clearly articulated computational models of 
heuristics, specifying details of the calculus by which decisions are made, as opposed to 
the broad labels, 
• fast and frugal reasoning invokes a ecological, rather than procedural, definition of 
rationality. It always asks is this decision-making process the best one for the 
environment the decision-maker finds himself in, rather than seeking for a globally 
applicable “rational” choice architecture. 
• less can be more in decision-making, especially in highly uncertain environments where 
accepting simple biased predictions may be preferable to attempting spuriously 
accurate estimates. 
we trace each of these themes as they emerge in financial decision-making below. 
       Neth et al (2014) point out often in a volatile market the non--stationary nature of financial data 
means much of the data that does exist is of little use increasing the role of uncertainty, as opposed to 
risk, in characterising the choice faced.  
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1.5. When will fast and frugal reasoning work best? 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2009) state the trade--off between complex forecasting models and 
simpler heuristics thus 
       ”In statistical terms, when faced with out-of-sample or out of population prediction, a 
forecasting method has to bet on robustness instead of trying to secure and optimal fit to the 
past, particularly if samples are small, cues are abundant, predictability is moderate or low, and 
there is a chance of overfitting." (Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2009, p 761)    
       In this their views reflect a research tradition little discussed in Finance research arguing for the 
“robust beauty” of simple models for prediction (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974, Dawes, 1979, Makridas 
and Hibon, 1979, 2000). While what constitutes an optimal forecast clearly depends on a particular 
investor's loss-function Lim (2001) it seems clear simple models beat complex ones for a wide-range of 
purposes.  
       Each of the Goldstein and Gigerenzer criteria for the desirability of robust decision-making seems 
to be met in financial markets. Indeed the low predictability of asset prices is a central tenet of the 
efficient market hypothesis. Another factor favouring the use of simple rules for prediction, as opposed 
to more complex multivariate models, is measurement error in relationships which are fundamentally 
monotonic.  
       Lord (1962) points out that when more than one predictor is measured with error it will often 
make sense to simply average out the measurement errors made, allowing an underlying multivariate 
function to be adequately approximated by a simple linear function.  Often in financial studies trading 
costs and taxes will mean true investor expected returns are measured with error implying such 
arguments for simplicity may have some force.     
1.6. Financial decision-making the fast and frugal way. 
       Based on their insights Gigerenzer and co-authors have developed a set of simple decision-
making schemata to enable fast and frugal methods of decision-making. 
Prominent amongst these are fast and frugal decision-making trees. 
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       An example of such a tree, perhaps useable by an investor, might take the form of Figure 1.  
 
 
Here the investor simply buys stocks attracting buy recommendations and upward revisions in their 
forecasted earnings. This investment strategy, of course, ignores the difference between hold and sell 
recommendations and the difference between stocks with large and small upward revisions. While this 
ignorance biases our estimates it supplants any need for estimation and hence the damage out-of-
sample prediction error does to implied trading profits suggested by the recent presence of in-sample 
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profits. The frugality of this heuristic might be its very strength, with richer alternatives  appearing  to 
offer higher, but far less stable, profits.    
Neth et al (2014) points to three contexts where the parsimony of fast and frugal decision-making of 
this type might appeal 
  
• highly uncertain choices, where risk based calculations seem forced, 
• choices where many options are presented as available, requiring substantial search, 
• choices where little information truly relevant to the choice being made is available.  
Here a fast and frugal tree method of solution might be preferable to any standard “rational” mode of 
choice.  
1.7 The purpose of heuristics.  
       The great value to decision-makers of heuristics is in making our choices cleaner, more 
decisive and less hedged around by fears. As TF&S puts it 
 “The most coherent stories are not the most probable, but they are plausible, and the notions 
of coherence, plausibility and probability are all easily confused by the unwary.” (p 159) 
   
       Part of this this desire for coherence derives from a marked preference most of us express for 
certainty, as opposed to recognising and evaluating, risks (Gigerenzer, 2014). Gigerenzer and Todd 
(1999) point out such a vision of heuristic choice can be misleading because it misses out on man's 
adaptive nature. They see the search for abstract logical consistency as detracting from the essence of 
a heuristic's goal which is to produce, better, more favourable to the heuristic's user, outcomes. For 
them 
       “The focus of heuristics is not to be coherent. Rather their function is to make reasonable, 
adaptive inferences about the real social and physical world given limited time and knowledge.” 
(Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999) 
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To resolve this problem of not whether investors will act rationally, but how they will do so, 
Gigerenzer develops his adaptive toolbox of decision-making heuristics to this purpose. This toolbox 
may include calculations of expected utility; but will often demure from doing so in favour of some 
other mode of fast and frugal reasoning.  
       Crucially rationality for Gigerenzer is very much ecological and not confined to some given 
procedural form. This mode of reasoning, while clearly more opportunistic and less consistent in form 
may still be preferable in its outcomes for investors.   
 2. K&T versus Gigerenzer: divisions and unities.  
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       The debate between K&T and Gigerenzer thus concerns not so much the presence of biases in 
investor decision-making but how those biases are best captured to determine when their impact is 
most intense and, conversely, most ameliorated.  
       Gigerenzer and his colleagues specifically seek to model the operation and deployment of 
heuristics in decision-making which extends beyond a mere assertion of their presence. As Gigerenzer 
states the problem       
       “The problem with heuristics  is that they explain both too little and too much. Too little 
because we do not know when these heuristics work and how; too much because post hoc, one 
of them can be fitted to almost any experimental result."  Gigerenzer, 1996, p 592. 
 
       So if heuristics are so valuable to investors why have they received such a bad press by Finance 
academics? Part of the reason seems to be that heuristics, are invoked almost as slogans, or buzz-
words of indeterminate (and possibly no) meaning.   
2.1 Some examples of heuristics 
Examples of decision-making heuristics and their power abound but some simple examples are (see 
Schwartz, 2010) 
1. representativeness, or constructing the distribution of expected outcomes according to the data 
that made most impression on your mind, 
2. availability, investing in what you know, avoid the unknown/untrusted, 
3. anchoring and adjustment, using benchmarks, like yesterday's price movement, to judge 
current returns, 
4. affect or emotion in financial decisions, for example the effect of variations in the length of 
day/daily sunlight on the movements of stock markets (Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003). 
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2.2 The initial dispute. 
       While the debate between K&T and Gigerenzer continues it initially surfaced in an exchange 
of conflicting views in 1996 (see Gigerenzer, 1996, and  Kahneman and Tversky, 1996) and the  essence 
of it remains unchanged and unresolved. 
To set the scene for later discussion we initially revisit this exchange of views in the 
Psychological Review, the primary research Journal of the American Psychological Association. This 
began with K&T's article "On the reality of cognitive illusions'' that accused Gigerenzer of greatly 
misrepresenting their research program in his earlier published work.  
K&T object to Gigerenzer's assertion that in their research program they regard the choices 
their subjects make in an uncertain environment as context free.  K&T counter this criticism by pointing 
to the role of the adoption of decision-making frames in their schemata for decision-making.  
So while for both authors context is central to understanding choices made Gigerenzer's 
adoption of the bounded rationality concept helps him say more about how that context dependence 
works out in practice. For Gigerenzer the primary issue is not whether a particular bias is exhibited at 
all, but rather the precise conditions under which it will emerge and grow.    
       Overall K&T's initial response to Gigerenzer's critique is one of frustration at what they perceive to 
be a straw man mischaracterisation of their research agenda, as they put it 
 
“The position described by Gigerenzer is indeed easy to refute, but it bears little resemblance to 
ours, it is useful to remember that refutation of a caricature can be no more than a caricature 
of refutation." Kahneman and Tversky, 1996, p 583. 
 
  In their initial reply to Gigerenzer's critique (Kahneman and Tversky, 1996), K&T discuss three 
issues which have become constant themes of later disputes, these are:  
• base rate neglect and representation of uncertain outcomes almost regardless of the base      
probability of an event's occurrence, 
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• conjunct errors of the type  which derive from believing the probability a stock will rise in 
value is less than the probability it will rise by more than 10%, 
• overconfidence, which K&T claim to chronicle in a variety of contexts but Gigerenzer 
disputes since this seems to conflate, overconfidence and the ex-ante concept of accuracy,  
which can only be really known to an investor ex-post.  
Specifically Gigerenzer seemed to claim that since probabilistic reasoning has both a frequentist 
and bayesian/subjective source of justification any invocation of probability in stylising observed choice 
is either meaningless or opportunistic. This seems a somewhat high-minded philosophical position 
rather than a practical one in the view of K&T (1996).   
  Secondly, because many of the “biases” K&T pointed out seemed to be ameliorated, or even 
removed, when choices were presented in frequency distribution, rather than probabilistic, terms 
these alleged biases are suspect or more apparent than real in Gigerenzer's view  (Meder and 
Gigerenzer, 2014) 
     More importantly Gigerenzer's research seems to understand and in the limit predict the sort of 
contexts in which cognitive illusions of the three types K&T discuss appear and disappear. Hence for 
Gigerenzer arguments over the strength of evidence for particular biases is largely beside the point. He 
presents his case in reply to K&T's rejoinder to his critique thus 
     “In place of plausible heuristics that explain everything and nothing .... we will need models that 
make surprising (and falsifiable) predictions that reveal mental processes that explain both valid and 
invalid judgements.” (Gigerenzer, 1996), pp. 596. 
 
Gigerenzer, (2014) highlights two particular illusions worthy of our consideration 
• confusing risky outcomes for certain ones, for example “you can never go wrong if you 
buy property”, 
•  confusing risky outcomes with uncertain ones,  
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   The latter type of illusion may be have been a problem for financial professionals and regulators 
in the recent financial crisis as “once in a lifetime" events cumulated to devastating effect.   
 2.3 Homo Heuristicus: an alternative objective framework for understanding financial decisions. 
       For Gigerenzer this limitation of the K&T research agenda reflects at least two sorts of 
problems (Gigerenzer, 1996) 
• the narrow/stylised way in which many alleged norms of behaviour are constructed and 
invoked to decry deviations from them as “irrational”. 
• the invocation of vague heuristics, as opposed to the development of explicit models of how 
those heuristics might emerge and be used to aid practical decision-making.  
  
     The first problem arises when probability judgements and laws are invoked to address often rather 
unique decisions for which it is unreasonable to expect the subject to construct an even approximate 
frequency distribution, for example Greece leaving the Euro area (Grexit). 
     Gigerenzer argues forcefully for the focus of research to shift to a structured model of heuristic 
development, proliferation, adaption and abandonment according to the decision-making context in 
which the heuristic will be deployed.  That is Gigerenzer's quest is to trace the evolutionary path of 
heuristic adoption, adaption and abandonment, as opposed to some globally applicable concept of 
investor rationality.       
 Gigerenzer thus us states his research objective as follows 
     “it is time to overcome the differences between the rational and the psychological and to 
reunite the two.” Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996, p 29. 
 
     In order to achieve this objective Gigerenzer and his many co-authors have advanced a set of 
decision-making rules inspired by Herbert Simon's notion that agents ``satisfice'', rather than maximise, 
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their well-being given the limited time and information resources they have at their disposal   
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996).  
  Such models invoke simple decision-making cues that require minimal computational effort and 
may even violate the most basic rules of what is typically characterised as “rational” behaviour.   
3. Applications to financial decision-making. 
  
       In this final substantive section we discuss how the Gigerenzer's insights, and the fast and 
frugal reasoning approach more generally has already been applied and might be so in the future to 
understand how financial decisions are made. As will be seen the potential for application is very wide 
and so the examples we give here should be regarded as simply illustrative, rather than exhaustive, by 
the reader.  
       We begin by considering how Gigerenzer's broad message concerning the link between cognition 
and context repeats itself in many examples of recent Finance scholarship. In a second subsection we 
discuss heuristic tools embraced by practitioners that are often ridiculed, or simply ignored, by Finance 
academics.  
3.1 Cognition & context in financial decision-making.    
       While direct application of Gigerenzer's framework is rare (but see Borges et al, 1999, Aikman 
et al, 2014, Neth et al, 2014) its central intuition can be broadly applied. We begin our consideration of 
how cognition and context shape each other in financial decisions with the most commonly invoked 
heuristic  in financial markets  research, the representativeness heuristic.  
3.1.1 Representativeness    
Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) point to ambiguities in application of perhaps the most famous 
heuristic of all, the representativeness heuristic. This heuristic is sometimes stated to imply that we 
© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
 20 
construct a distribution of expected outcomes according to our distribution of impressions. So, for 
example, the representative heuristic has been used to explain 
• The "hot hand" effect that sometimes a person is "on a roll" and scores from every 
free-kick, or plants home every shot at basket, forming a streak of good luck (Tversky 
and Gilovich, 1989), and simultaneously, 
•  the "gambler's fallacy" or the spoof "law of small numbers", this is the belief that 
small samples must approximate the population they are drawn from. So after a poor 
run my "luck must change" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971, Rabin, 2002) 
       In a very similar way K&T often attribute base-rate neglect to the operation of the 
representativeness heuristic. Yet the very opposite tendency, now labelled conservatism, is also seen 
to derive from the very same representativeness heuristic.  
Bulkley and Herrerias (2005) apply the law of small numbers, in the form formalised by Rabin (2002), to 
understand the stock market's response to profit warnings. These authors report less precise 
disclosures about the extent of bad news serves to intensify the stock market's negative reaction to a 
below par earnings announcement. Giving a revised earnings forecast, as opposed to just saying bad 
news is on the way, mitigates the stock market drop once earnings are finally announced.  
       So perhaps less information is not more useful in aiding prediction in every context as a quick 
reading of the fast and frugal literature might suggest. Further it serves to remind us that heuristic--
driven choices are often not the best and active (System 2) calculative reasoning has its benefits too. 
This is especially so when choices are framed to illicit certain heuristics by those presenting the choices 
(companies, banks, etc)  
       It appears the invocation of heuristics as little more than slogan/labels results in us attempting to 
explain almost every sort of behaviour and hence adequately explaining none at all. This has led to 
behavioural finance research often being seen as a merely a rag bag of jumbled empirical anomalies to 
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which heuristics exhibited in laboratory conditions (usually by students) are applied with little attempt 
to impose or check for internal consistency (Fama, 1998).  
When our understanding of heuristics develops by means of merely anecdotal evidence one 
should not be surprised at encountering some scepticism amongst critics of behavioural explanations. 
Stephen Ross (Ross, 2002) states the case neatly in a discussion of the closed-end fund puzzle and the 
face-off between neoclassical and behavioural explanations of that phenomena.  
       “if the only hope is to delve  deeply into psychology then I believe that the theorist will find 
less there than meets the eye.” (Ross, 2002, p. 136) 
       Gigerenzer seeks to advance the discussion about the presence of various heuristic tools onto the 
nature of their invocation and operation in practical decision-making, for example in developing trading 
strategies or implementing prudential bank regulation (Aikman et al, 2014). In short he wants to move 
the heuristics and biases literature on from identification and classification to the development of an 
overarching theory of heuristic driven choice. Thus he states  
       “It is understandable that when heuristics were first proposed as the underlying cognitive 
processes in the 1970's they were loosely characterised. Yet, 25 years and many experiments 
later, explanatory notions such as representativeness seem vague, undefined, and unspecified 
with respect to both the antecedent conditions that elicit (or suppress) them and also to the 
cognitive processes that underlie them." (Gigerenzer, 1996, p 592) 
       In this sense we might regard Gigerenzer and his co-authors as completing a research project 
commenced by  K&T, rather than simply critiquing it, although an element of critique and tension 
between the two approaches must certainly remain.  
3.1.2 Reference points, framing and endowments. 
       For the investor in a standard utility model all that matters is outcomes and their 
probabilities, with the past, with its joys and sorrows, being irrelevant. But for the prospect theory 
investor  what matters are changes not levels of wealth. So what I had in the past, how "people like me 
live", matters. Being unable to buy my own house, privately educate my children, or send them to 
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University may hurt more if they were comforts I enjoyed in my own childhood or are normal amongst 
my social peers.  
       So context matters not just the outcomes themselves. In particular losses matter and hurt more 
than gains of equivalent magnitude please me. So I may stop having weekends in London hotels in the 
face of price hikes. But price discounts may not necessarily attract me back as a customer because I 
have become accustomed to being doing without trips to London.  
 The “endowment effect” teaches us that what I have I hold, for example the tradition of 
privately educating our children (TFS, p. 290).  But unlike Gigerenzer K&T seem to say little about how 
rationality evolves to allow investors to adopt the best cognitive frame given the trading environment 
they inhabit.          
 K&T have specified the context for decision-making with respect to risk into a very simple four-
fold typology, suggested by the tenets of prospect theory (TF&S, p 317). This typology stratifies the 
expected response to prospective outcomes according whether that outcome is a gain or loss and its 
probability of occurrence. Over gambles with outcomes of fairly high probability, so outcomes are 
almost known, the standard division between risk-aversion over positive pay-off gambles and risk-
seeking in the loss-domain applies.  
 
 Gains Losses 
High probability Fear of disappointment, 
Risk-averse  
 
Hope to avoid loss, 
Risk-seeking 
 
Low Probability Hope of large gain 
Risk-seeking 
Fear of large loss, 
Risk-averse 
Table 1: The four-fold nature of risk-attitudes. 
 
       But it appears a risk-averse attitude may extend to losses with a smaller probability of 
occurrence if this loss is potentially large. Similarly for low probability gains an element of "hope" 
encourages risk-seeking with respect to those gains. Hence the usual division between risk-seeking 
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over losses and risk-aversion over gains needs to conditioned upon the probability of prospective 
losses or gains being considered.    
       Here in the bottom right--hand cell of Table 1 insurance becomes an attractive way of planning for 
the remote possibility of having to endure a large loss, sudden death or a permanently debilitating 
injury. Whereas for a loss that was more easily anticipated we might expect to see “gambling for 
resurrection” of the type commonly observed by traders down on their luck (a pathological example 
being Nick Leeson of Barings fame in 1995 (Leeson, 1997).  
  In this typology adoption and disposal of clearly segmented mental frames mimics the simple 
cues for decision-making Gigerenzer and co-authors adopt in their models. This reminds us that what 
K&T and Gigerenzer share in their analysis, for example, a sensitivity to variation in mental 
frames/choice context, is at least a great as what divides them.   
3.2 Portfolio theory. 
       No decent Finance class can be taught without much reference to β sensitivities in the CAPM 
or some more complicated multi-factor  asset pricing model. Much time is spent refining the 
estimation and testing of such models. But what if simply investing an equal amount in each stock 
returns turns out to be a more profitable strategy than calculating portfolio weights by means of 
quadratic optimisation, as suggested by Markowitz, (1952)? It appears this simple heuristic may indeed 
be very powerful and capable of generating more profitable advice on portfolio selection than 
standard asset-pricing models in Finance (DiMiguel et al, 2009). 
The standard rational approach to portfolio composition is that developed by Markowitz (1952, 
1956 and 1959).  This approach shows how to optimally allocate wealth between risky assets in a static 
setting assuming investors are only concerned with the mean and variance of a portfolio.  This 
optimisation, while relatively simple in theory, is often difficult to implement in practice.  The asset 
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weights produced tend to be unstable over time and perform very poorly out of sample (see, for 
example, Hodges and Brealey, 1978, Michaud, 1989; Best and Grauer, 1991 and Litterman, 2003).  
Various methods of selecting portfolios using simple heuristics have been proposed and shown to have 
some advantages relative to the Markowitzian approach. We discuss two of these below, restricting 
parameter search and the   rule. 
       Standard asset pricing models require estimates of risk-factor weights, βs, to determine optimal 
asset allocations. Such estimates are typically assumed to be drawn from stable distributions. The 
problem being that such weights are constantly shifting. Hence any model that fits observed market 
data well may not predict future risk-exposures satisfactorily. Like any good estimate risk-weights must 
trade--off two important properties 
• bias, resulting from buying into too much risk at too high a price, or failing to optimally diversify 
the portfolio. 
• variance, loading up on a given risk-exposure just as the return to exposure to it is about to fall, 
yielding an estimation error in predicting returns. 
  Brighton and Gigerenzer (2015) point out that in a legitimate concern to reduce bias in 
predicting social and economic outcomes researchers have fallen victim to what they term the "the 
bias bias'', where 
       “To suffer from the bias bias is to develop, deploy, or prefer models that are likely to 
achieve low bias, while simultaneously paying little attention to models with low variance.” 
(Brighton and Gigerenzer, 2015, p.1) 
  
       Of course great estimates are both precise and stable. But to achieve such precise and stable 
estimates may require far more data than most asset markets permit. 
  DeMiguel et al (2009) estimate that for the US market if the investor desires to retrieve 
portfolio weights capable of beating the performance of an equally weighted portfolio he will need 
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3,000 months (or 250 years) of data to estimate his factor weights over a 25 stock portfolio. This rises 
to 6,000 months (or 500 years) for a 50 asset portfolio. Knowing this begins to make the heuristic seem 
attractive. This suggests a simple heuristic might dominate one of the central theoretical tenets of 
standard Finance as a tool for investment.   
       Simple heuristics to limit the parameter search can improve the predictive accuracy of models 
(Jagannathan and Ma, 2003). While practitioners often estimate the optimal portfolio imposing short-
sales constraints academic worry that this might induce specification error. Jagannathan and Ma (2003) 
point out that while the academics concern is true imposing even invalid constraints may help mitigate 
estimation error by constraining the parameter space considered. The practical value of imposing even 
invalid constraints depends on the trade-off between the two possible sources of error. In their own 
empirical work constraining admittedly invalid constraints appeared worthwhile.    
       The truth, as in many things, may lie somewhere in the middle. Tu and Zhou (2011) report that an 
average portfolio return produced by combining the forecast returns from the   rule with that from 
the basic Markowitz model, plus various enhancements to that model, exceeds the return offered by 
either  the   rule or the basic Markowitz models alone. Once again the context of application 
determines the best model, or combination thereof, to apply.    
 
3.3 Implications for asset allocation  
A related portfolio problem is how to adjust portfolio composition to allow for the risk appetite 
of investors.  In the Markowitz paradigm the mutual fund separation theorem (MFST) applies.  That is 
all investors should hold the same portfolio of risky assets and adjust for their risk preferences by 
borrowing or investing at the risk free rate.  To quote Canner et al. (1997)   
“all investors hold risky assets in the same proportions. In particular, every investor 
holds the same ratio of bonds to stocks. To achieve the desired balance of risk and return, 
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investors simply vary the fraction of their portfolios made up of the riskless asset?”  Canner et 
al (1997), p182. 
However, Canner et al. (1997) also report a puzzle in that financial advisors use a heuristic in 
advising their clients that is not consistent with the MFST.  Many advisors give guidance consistent with 
the idea that the more risk averse a client is the higher should be the ratio of bonds to stocks in their 
portfolio.  It has proved a largely fruitless task to try and reconcile such asset allocation advice to 
standard portfolio theory.   
Keasey and Hudson (2007) show that when the reasoning of the advisors is investigated it can 
be shown that for the worst case scenarios (analogous to Value at Risk) the heuristic financial advisors  
use frequently outperforms the MFST, given the prevailing non-normal distribution of returns we 
observe.  
3.5 Earnings quality. 
A central issue in capital market research in accounting is the quality of announced earnings, 
this has been measured by earnings persistence, the relative stability of accruals and cash--flows as 
elements in overall earnings, the information content of accruals, the avoidance of restatements or 
sanctions by regulatory authorities and other metrics. Initial debate focussed on whether companies 
with publicly or privately held equity reported higher quality earnings. The relative ranking of earnings 
quality was unclear because two opposing, yet credible, theorisations of the determinants of earnings 
quality exist (Givoly et al, (2010) these are 
1. a theory that greater demand for high quality earnings ensures public companies report more 
informative earnings,  and so distort accruals less, 
2. a theory that public companies have more opportunity to mislead investors and for that 
reason take these opportunities.  
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 Givoly et al (2010) study a unique database of companies to resolve this issue. They examine a 
matched sample of relatively large companies where each company with publicly traded equity is 
matched to one with publicly traded debt. Of course both these sort of companies face an active 
demand for high-quality earnings by outside investors. The authors find on a number of commonly 
employed metrics companies with publicly traded debt, but no traded equity, exhibit higher earnings 
quality. This finding is striking as it appears to contradict earlier findings by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
that companies traded on stock markets have higher quality earnings in the sense of being more 
“conservative” by recognising future losses more quickly and thus forewarning equity investors. 
This patchwork of contradictory findings depending on the method of sample construction and 
the measure of ``earnings'' quality used shows that context is all. Earnings quality is many faceted and 
the most useful definition of that elusive trait will depend on the demands placed on auditors and their 
opportunities to circumvent those demands.   
This contexual nature of earnings quality is important as financial reporting is harmonised by 
International Reporting Standards (see Soderstrom and Sun (2007) and Barth et al (2008)).  
Dechow et al (2010) after reviewing the various empirical proxies available to capture earnings 
quality conclude they 
“can reach no single conclusion on what earnings quality is because “quality” is 
contingent on the decision-context.” Dechow et al, (2010), p 344. 
   
  investors' cognitive perception of quality is formed within a context from which it cannot be 
separated.  
It seems unreasonable to expect the demands made for earnings quality and the opportunities 
to circumvent providing it to remain constant across the 28 states constituting the European Union3 
which have adopted IFRS standards wholesale. If we accept this, could less earnings quality be more 
                                                        
3 Even before Albania, Serbia and Macedonia join. 
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informative for investors, or at least not noticeably less informative, from an investors' perspective in 
some member states?    
3.6 Overreaction, mean-reversion. 
Within Finance perhaps the most conclusively documented bias is the failure of investors to 
recognise regression to the mean, ``trees don't grow to the sky." This inability to recognise that 
extreme outcomes reflect luck, as well as skill, underpins the overreaction anomaly   (Debondt and 
Thaler, 1985, and 1990). While all of us know Success = Talent + Luck  (TF&S, p 177), we nonetheless 
still prefer to build up our heroes and stigmatise slackers. Indeed it appears much of sports and 
business commentary is haunted by attempts to rationalise luck.  To say Steve Jobs was quite a lucky 
bunny is just never enough it seems.  
  Here too both the degree and timing of market overreaction/mean--reversion seems highly 
context dependent. Lee and Swaminathan, (2000) supply evidence to support the operation of a 
“Momentum Life Cycle" in which high volume, often glamorous, stocks attract investor attention and 
thus unsustainable gains/losses while less heavily traded, often value, stocks are set to enter periods of 
price--correction.   
In their representation of the phenomena (see Figure 4 of their paper) momentum is clustered 
amongst high volume winning stocks and low volume loser stocks. The high volume winner stocks are 
propelled by a rising tide of “me too” dumb-money investors. Momentum amongst low volume losers 
is driven by the last of the dumb-money investors quietly closing the door as they depart. All this 
happening prior to smarter, contrarian, investors re-entering the stock to correct its price to something 
closer to fundamental value. 
In both cases the pattern of momentum/reversion the stock exhibits depends less on its 
true/intrinsic value and more of the extent of its recent exposure to investor attention and thus trading 
activity. Once again context is all for overreaction to manifest itself in any particular stock.     
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This should not be too surprising as it is far from clear we would want to issue predictions that 
recognise regression to the mean even if we were capable of doing so. Hugely successful serial 
entrepreneurs often seem to be those who can accept the improbable, if not downright delusional, as 
a basis for intense commitment  (Lewis, 1999).  
3.7 Bank failure 
In his recent work with the Financial Stability Board (Aikman et al 2014) Gigerenzer considers 
the use of heuristic tools in evaluating a bank's capital adequacy and the related problem of bank 
failure. Figure 2 illustrates a fast and frugal tree the authors present for assessing the vulnerability of 
systemically important banks to failure. It assesses a bank's fragility over four key variables which are 
used to generate four red flags to warn a regulator to intervene and two green flags to suggest no 
intervention is required.   
So any bank with less than 4.1% of equity to cover its debts raises an immediate red flag 
initiating a possible investigation. Similarly, a bank whose equity covers less than 84% of the market 
value of its equity raises a second red flag. If the bank's whole funding falls below 177 $bn, or if it has a 
loan to deposit ratio of above 1.47, then intervention is immediately required. The precise number of 
red/green flags required for the regulator to act is for experimentation/discussion, but these trigger 
measures provide an easily followed prudential banking protocol.  
As in the earlier example of using earnings forecasts and recommendations in investment, this 
fast and frugal method of reasoning ignores the numerical variation in these key ratios beyond their 
trigger points.   But accepting this bias might be preferable to attempting to find a model with 
sufficiently stable coefficients to convert good in-sample explanatory power into good out-of-sample 
predictions of which banks will fail. 




3.8 Heuristic tools in financial decision-making. 
3.8.1 Technical Analysis. 
Practitioners have long used technical analysis to predict future price movements on the basis 
of past price movements, a practice directly at odds with weak-form stock--market efficiency.  The 
associated trading rules can be regarded as heuristics as they are often simple and loosely defined and 
certainly are not based on any notion of rational optimisation.  The historical evolution of technical 
analysis is traced by Lo and Hasanhodzic (2010). It was used in 18th century Japan where a form of 
technical analysis known as candlestick charting was used (Park and Irwin, 2007). In the West, Dow 
Theory which was developed in the late 1800s by Charles Dow, the Editor of the Wall Street Journal, 
and was used in an effort to develop profitable trading strategies (Lo and Hasanhodzic, 2010).  Thus 
technical analysis pre-dates by a wide margin all modern financial economics.    
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Technical analysis has been and continues to be used very extensively in many financial 
markets. Smidt (1965) reports that the majority of amateur traders in the US commodity futures 
markets exclusively use charts to identify trends.  Similarly, Billingsley and Chance (1996) find that 
about 60% of commodity trading advisors make heavy use of computer-guided technical trading 
systems. More recently, Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) find widespread use of technical analysis in the 
foreign exchange markets and Menkhoff (2010) finds that the vast majority of fund managers both use 
technical analysis and prefer using it rather than fundamentals based methods of prediction.  
 
Given the lack of a theoretical basis for the trading rules there has often been a predisposition to 
dismiss them in the academic literature (see, for example, Malkiel, 1999).  The scepticism was 
reinforced in the early days of financial economics by negative empirical findings regarding the 
profitability of various technical rules in stock markets (Fama and Blume, 1966,van Horne and Parker, 
1967, 1968, Jensen and Benington, 1970). However, there have been many subsequent empirical 
findings relating to different financial markets showing that technical analysis cannot be dismissed and 
certainly has predictive power in some markets at certain times (see, Park and Irwin, 2007, for a 
general survey and Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007 for a discussion relevant to the foreign exchange 
markets).  
The wide use of technical analysis both across all asset classes and over a long time also raises 
questions about how a practice that is so derided by standard Finance theory can be so persistent.  In 
summary, the particular set of heuristics constituting the “adaptive toolbox” of technical traders 
should not  readily be dismissed as sub-optimal and thus unworthy of reasoned discussion.  
3.8.2 Outperformance of Value Stocks. 
The case of the outperformance of value stocks is a very interesting one where mainstream 
theory has converged upon an existing heuristic.  The heuristic that value stocks tend to outperform in 
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the stock market has been well-known to practitioners for many decades and is extensively discussed 
in the seminal book The Intelligent Investor by Graham which was first published in 1949 (Graham, 
1949). 
Graham considered that the value effect was driven by the misconceptions of investors who 
tend to overvalue glamour stocks and undervalue less exciting value stocks. The notion that value 
stocks might outperform does not fit into classical MPT from a theoretical point of view, as value could 
not be expected to be related to risk as measured by standard deviation, and so was sidelined by 
academics in the early decades of financial economics.   Nonetheless the empirical fact that value 
stocks outperform could not ultimately be ignored. Thus value has been incorporated as one of the 
factors in the now widely used three-factor model developed as a successor to MPT (see Fama and 
French, 1993) albeit retaining the notion of rationality by interpreting value as a rational reward for 
accepting an element of risk not captured by the CAPM. 
3.8.3 Seasonal anomalies  
Seasonal anomalies or calendar effects have been investigated in a huge academic literature 
(see Dzhabarov and Ziemba, (2010) for a fairly recent overview of this area) much of which indicates 
that taking advantage of these patterns may be beneficial in terms of investment timing. These effects 
generally have not been explained within the standard rational framework but readily lend themselves 
to being used as simple heuristics. Indeed, in some cases, these heuristics were definitely known and 
used by practitioners before being reported in the academic literature.   
For example, the ``turn of the month'' effect (TOTM), which shows that stock returns are 
substantially higher around the turn of calendar months, was initially reported by market experts such 
as Merrill (1966) and only later in academic studies by Ariel (1987) and by Lakonishok and Smidt 
(1988). The Halloween effect and the very closely related ``sell-in-May-and-go-away'' effect, which 
indicate that stock returns are lower in the summer months, did not explicitly appear in the academic 
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literature until a paper by Bouman and Jacobsen (2002), although Gultekin and Gultekin (1983) also 
cover closely related issues. However, as Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) make clear, this rule was well 
known to market practitioners for many decades before it received academic interest. It had clearly 
been learned inductively as a trading tool, rather than deduced from any formal theory of financial 
decision--making.  
 
3.8.4 Investing in what you know. 
Familiarity breeds investment (Huberman, 2001) as much research on home-bias puzzle in portfolio 
allocation attests. A starting point of nearly all such finance research is how unwise investors, 
particularly individual investors, are to invest in their company's, state’s, or nation's stock rather than 
in an alien, less familiar, one  (French and Poterba, 1991, Baxter, 1994). But could it be that in 
investment a little knowledge is a beautiful thing? 
Borges et al (1999) claim that it is and invoke what they call the “recognition heuristic” to 
explain how ignorance can be turned into profit. They construct portfolios based on the ability of 
German and American experts (Finance class students in Chicago and Munich respectively) and 
laypeople (people walking the streets in Chicago and Munich) to recognise German and American 
stocks. The authors simply bought the most recognised stocks and compared their performance to 
standard benchmark portfolios. They find that recognised stocks outperform unrecognised stocks on 
most sensible benchmarks, a random draw of stocks, returns earned by large popular mutual funds in 
the US and Germany, or the S&P 500 and DAX index returns respectively. Furthermore the 
performance of a portfolio based on the ability of laypeople, strolling in the park, to recognise stocks 
beats that of a portfolio based on recognition by Finance students, who should at least have some 
passing interest in investing. Amusingly Gigerenzer's results from this study themselves proved rather 
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context-dependent when Boyd (2001) repeated the study during a subsequent recession and obtained 
almost completely opposing results.  
Note the “recognition heuristic” can only help those with a little knowledge, a professional 
investor who recognises all the stocks in the S&P 500 or DAX cannot use it. In the same way the utterly 
clueless, who have not heard of a single stock, cannot rely on the recognition heuristic. For Goldstein 
and Gigerenzer (2002) the recognition heuristic is a powerful tool in the context of gaps in knowledge. 
It works best in structured environments where inference from partial knowledge seems worthwhile. 
Here recognition emerges as a powerful tool of adaptive rationality.  
“the recognition heuristic is a cognitive adaptation. In cases of extremely limited 
knowledge, it is perhaps the only strategy an organism can follow. However, it is also adaptive 
in the sense that there are situations... in which the recognition heuristic results in more 
accurate inferences than a considerable amount of knowledge can achieve.” Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer, (2002, p 88). 
Hence it appears a little knowledge may be a wonderful thing for investors. The fact that 
experts were at a disadvantage in forming a portfolio for purchase based on their recognition of the 
stock suggests even quite a lot of ignorance maybe no bad thing in investment. Certainly, experimental 
evidence reported by Weber et al  (2005) confirms that familiarity with a stock lowers the perceived 
risk of holding it in an investor's portfolio.  Indeed this underestimate of the risks of the familiar may 
account for the persistence of observed home bias in investor's portfolios.   
It is certainly true that recognition of a stock reflects both its glamour and market capitalisation 
which are known to be related to investment performance, as demonstrated by their appearance in 
the ubiquitous Fama and French asset pricing model (1993). But this to some degree makes their 
outperformance of mutual fund portfolios and national indices more, not less, difficult to understand, 
because large (presumably well recognised) stocks actually tend to perform poorly, even though 
glamour (also well recognised) stocks do tend to perform well. 
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3.8.5 Derivatives valuation. 
The standard rational approaches to derivatives valuation are based on the principle of no-
arbitrage.  The most celebrated model is the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) model for option valuation 
originally developed in papers by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973).  This model is often 
regarded as the break-through model in financial economics and was certainly a technical tour-de-
force, using differential calculus to solve a dynamic hedging problem and yet producing a tractable 
formula ready for use by those incapable of understanding its derivation.   
The BSM formula is ubiquitous in financial markets and so would seem a clear triumph for the 
rational approach.  In reality things are not so clear cut, with some high profile practitioners strongly 
dissenting from this viewpoint. Huag and Taleb (2011) forcefully argue that, in practice, option traders 
use heuristics not the BSM formula.  They state: 
“Option hedging, pricing and trading are neither philosophy or mathematics, but an extremely 
rich craft with heuristics with traders learning from traders (or traders copying other traders) 
and tricks developing under evolutionary pressures, in a bottom-up manner.” Haug and Taleb, 
2011, 97.  
The BSM valuation equation assumes that returns have a Gaussian distribution with a variance 
that is independent of the strike price of the option and the time to expiry of the option.  The 
assumption of variance independence clearly cannot be supported empirically and if uncorrected leads 
to very significant option mis-pricing, to the extent that using the pure unadjusted BSM is very likely to 
lead to financial disaster.  Goldstein and Taleb (2007) present evidence that professional traders may 
not even display a coherent understanding of what volatility measures.   
In practice, participants in the options markets use the “volatility smile” a somewhat crude 
adjustment to the BSM model by which volatility can be adjusted to vary by strike price and time to 
expiry.  The volatility smile is inconsistent with the theory used in the derivation of the BSM model (see 
Haug and Taleb, 2011, p105) although generally, allowing for this adjustment, practitioners can still be 
said to be using the BSM model.  Given the volatility smile adjustment is very ad hoc it might be more 
© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
 36 
appropriate to say that they are actually using heuristics to value the option and then relate this back 
to the BSM model. 
Millo and MacKenzie (2009) note that the popularity of the BSM model showed no diminution 
after the 1987 stock market crash when huge surges in stock volatility meant the BSM model implied 
prices of equity call options well above the stock price of the underlying asset. The reason for its 
continued appeal was the model offered a common language for traders, clearing houses and 
regulators to discuss and dispute the impact of shared risks in the markets they jointly inhabited. As 
such the model was a more of a rhetorical device than the predictive tool it was initially marketed as.  
It allowed those in the market to communicate fears/hopes concerning an uncertain future they all 
faced rather than acting as a “risk-management” tool as such.    
4. What the dispute implies for finance research. 
Few can doubt the importance of K&T in the establishment of behavioural finance as it is 
currently understood, taught and researched. Both Kahneman and Gigerenzer agree on the centrality 
of heuristics to decision-making, including financial decisions.  
For K&T heuristics often appear as a fall-back once the von-Neumann-Morgenstern axioms of 
rational decision-making do not describe investors' choices.  Heuristics are then a patch-up, or repair 
job, on the standard financial decision--making model.  But for Gigerenzer heuristics are simply a more 
effective way of evaluating choices in the rich and changing decision--making environment investors 
must face.   
Gigerenzer challenges Kahneman to move beyond substantiating the presence of heuristics 
towards a more tangible, testable, description of their use and disposal within the  ever changing 
decision-making environment financial agents inhabit.  Here we see the emphasis placed by Gigerenzer 
on how context and cognition interact to form new schemata for fast and frugal reasoning as offering a 
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productive vein of new research.  We have illustrated above how the interaction between cognition 
and context already characterises much empirical research and it appears the fast and frugal reasoning 
perspective of Gigerenzer can provide a framework to enhance our understanding of how financial 
decisions are made.   
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